56,000 Abandoned Projects: What Nigerian Governors Can Learn From Pastors

There is something worth examining about the way some Nigerian churches conceive, finance and execute major projects. Across the country, religious institutions have established universities, hospitals, schools, conference centres and other facilities that have become enduring parts of their institutional identity. Some of these projects have been completed, expanded and sustained across successive leadership tenures.

Yet, in the public sector, the story is often different. Roads are awarded but left unfinished. Hospitals are constructed but remain unequipped. Schools are commissioned without adequate facilities. Government buildings and infrastructure projects consume public resources but sometimes fail to deliver the services for which they were conceived.

Why does an institution led by a pastor sometimes succeed in completing a major project while a government with access to public revenue, professional institutions and an extensive administrative structure struggles to finish a road or hospital?

The question is not intended to suggest that churches are inherently better managed than governments. Religious institutions also have incomplete projects, opaque financial practices and accountability challenges. Neither should the responsibilities of a church be equated with those of a government, which must provide services to millions of people across different communities.

But the comparison raises an important governance question: what do some churches understand about project delivery that Nigerian governments continue to get wrong?

In April 2026, former Director-General of the Budget Office of the Federation, Ben Akabueze, reportedly put the number of uncompleted government projects across Nigeria at more than 56,000. The figure, which should be understood as a reported estimate rather than a comprehensive, independently verified national inventory, illustrates the scale of concern surrounding project planning, financing and implementation.

The problem is not simply that projects are abandoned. It is that the systems responsible for delivering them often fail to make completion the overriding priority.

There are at least five lessons government can learn.

1. Money Must Be Available Before the Project Begins

One important difference between many church projects and government projects is the approach to financing.

Churches that successfully deliver major projects often work with a clearer understanding of their available resources, fundraising commitments and the financial implications of completion. They may raise funds in phases, mobilise members and supporters, and adjust the pace of construction to available resources.

Government projects, on the other hand, are sometimes initiated on the strength of anticipated budgetary allocations, projected revenue or political promises. A contract is awarded, mobilisation begins, and work progresses until the expected funding fails to arrive. The contractor slows down, payments accumulate, and eventually the project becomes another abandoned structure.

The problem is not necessarily that government lacks money. It is often that the decision to start a project is not sufficiently connected to the resources required to complete it.

A project should not become a public liability simply because an administration wants to demonstrate that it is working.

What government must do: No major public project should commence without a credible financing plan that demonstrates how it will be funded through completion. Where the available resources cannot support the entire project, government should adopt realistic phases, each with secured funding and clearly defined completion targets. It should also prioritise completing viable ongoing projects before spreading limited resources across new ones. The objective must be to finish fewer projects rather than leave many unfinished.

2. Someone Must Take Ownership of the Project

In many church projects, there is a recognisable leadership structure and an individual or institution that remains responsible for seeing the project through. The pastor may provide the vision, the church leadership may coordinate resources, and designated committees may oversee execution. Whatever the arrangement, there is usually an identifiable institutional authority to which progress can be reported.

Government projects often suffer from fragmented responsibility. A ministry initiates a project, a department supervises it, a contractor executes it, consultants provide technical oversight, and another agency may be responsible for its eventual use. When delays occur, responsibility becomes difficult to establish.

The contractor blames delayed payments. The ministry cites budgetary constraints. The supervising agency points to technical issues. The administration moves on, while the project remains unfinished.

A system in which everyone has a role but nobody appears to own the outcome is a system that makes failure easier to accommodate.

What government must do: Every major public project should have a clearly designated institution and accountable project manager responsible for delivery. Their responsibilities, timelines, performance targets and reporting obligations should be documented. Project ownership must be institutionalised so that accountability does not disappear when a commissioner, minister, governor or president leaves office. Citizens should be able to identify the institution responsible for a project’s progress and know where to direct questions when delivery falls behind schedule.

3. Leadership Transition Must Not Mean Project Abandonment

Another lesson from some church projects is institutional continuity.

A church does not necessarily abandon a university, hospital or school because a new pastor assumes leadership. The institution’s mission remains, and the project can continue under a different leader. The new leadership may introduce changes, but the existence of a predecessor does not automatically invalidate the institution’s commitments.

Government projects can become casualties of political succession. A new administration may abandon an inherited project because it was initiated by a political opponent, does not fit its immediate priorities or offers little opportunity for political recognition.

This is one of the most expensive consequences of political discontinuity. Public resources already invested in a project are put at risk, communities continue to wait for promised infrastructure, and the next administration may begin a similar project elsewhere.

A road does not become less necessary because another governor awarded the contract. A hospital does not lose its public value because the previous administration laid its foundation.

What government must do: Nigeria needs a stronger framework for project continuity. Every incoming administration should inherit a properly documented register of ongoing projects, including their financial status, contractual obligations, level of completion, outstanding payments and expected public benefits. Any decision to discontinue a project should be supported by a transparent technical, economic or public-interest justification. Where a project remains viable, completing it should be treated as a governance achievement, not a political concession to a predecessor.

4. The Institution That Builds Must Think About Who Will Use It

Some churches do not simply construct buildings; they build facilities for their own operations and institutional missions. They understand that a university must admit students, a hospital must provide healthcare, and a school must deliver education. Construction is only one stage in the process. The facility must eventually serve a purpose.

Government projects can suffer from a separation between construction and service delivery. The agency responsible for building a hospital may have little involvement in its eventual operation. A school may be completed without sufficient teachers or learning materials. A public facility may be commissioned without a realistic maintenance plan.

This produces a troubling situation in which government celebrates the completion of a structure without adequately considering whether the structure can deliver the service for which it was built.

A hospital without essential equipment and medical personnel is not a functioning healthcare facility. A school without teachers and learning resources is not delivering quality education. A water project that stops working months after commissioning has not solved the community’s water problem.

The distinction between completing a building and delivering a public service is one government must take seriously.

What government must do: Every public infrastructure project should have an operational plan before construction begins. That plan should identify who will manage the facility, the personnel and equipment required, the recurrent costs, the maintenance arrangements and the institution responsible for keeping it functional. Project success should be measured not only by physical completion but also by whether the facility is operational and delivering the service for which it was established. Commissioning should mark the beginning of public use, not the end of government responsibility.

5. Accountability Must Be Visible and Consequences Must Follow

Church projects are often visible to the congregations and donors who contribute to their realisation. Members can observe progress, ask questions and demand explanations. The relationship between contributors, leadership and the project can create pressure to deliver.

Government accountability is often more distant. Citizens finance public projects through taxes and national resources, but they may have little access to information about project costs, contractors, payments, timelines and implementation status. Public announcements and commissioning photographs can become the most visible evidence of progress, even when the actual state of the project tells a different story.

The findings of BudgIT’s Tracka 2024/2025 project monitoring exercise offer a useful illustration. The organisation monitored 2,760 government-funded projects across 28 states. It reported that 1,438 were completed, 660 were ongoing, 471 had not been executed and 99 were abandoned. Another 92 were categorised as fraudulently delivered. These categories matter: a project that was never executed is not the same as one that was abandoned, and neither should be confused with fraudulent delivery.

The figures point to a wider problem: budgetary provision and official announcements do not automatically translate into completed infrastructure or public benefit.

What government must do: Project information should be accessible to citizens. Governments should publish the approved cost of major projects, contractors, funding sources, commencement dates, expected completion dates, payments made and current implementation status. Independent audits, community monitoring and credible public reporting should become routine. Where investigations establish negligence, contract violations, diversion of funds or other wrongdoing, responsible officials and contractors must face appropriate consequences. Transparency must go beyond publishing figures; it must make it possible to verify what has actually been delivered.

Government Must Learn to Value Completion

The comparison between church projects and government projects should not be interpreted as an argument that religious institutions are automatically better governed or that government can simply replicate their structures. Churches and governments have different responsibilities, funding arrangements, institutional demands and scales of operation.

But the principles behind successful project delivery are not exclusive to religious institutions. Secured financing, clear ownership, continuity, operational planning and visible accountability are basic requirements of responsible management.

Nigeria’s problem is not simply that governments abandon projects. It is that the system often allows projects to be initiated without sufficient safeguards to ensure their completion. Political visibility is frequently attached to launching and commissioning projects, while less attention is paid to whether they are properly funded, completed, maintained and still serving the public years later.

A governor should not be judged primarily by the number of projects he announces, launches or commissions. The more important questions are: How many were completed? How many are functional? How many are delivering the benefits promised to citizens? And how many will remain useful after that administration has left office?

Perhaps this is the most important lesson government can learn from churches that successfully deliver major projects: leadership is not demonstrated by the ability to announce a vision. It is demonstrated by the discipline, structure and accountability required to turn that vision into something people can use.

A project is not a legacy because a leader started it. It becomes a legacy when the people it was meant to serve can still use it long after that leader has left.

[give_form id="20698"]