Who Appoints the Referee? Why Nigeria Needs an Independent Body to Choose Its INEC Chairman and Police Chief

Every contest needs a referee the players did not pick. In Nigeria, the two officials who matter most to the credibility of a general election, the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the Inspector-General of Police, are both chosen through the presidency. As the country moves towards 2027, that arrangement has become a trust problem that no amount of denial can remove.

This is not an argument about any one individual. It is an argument about design.

The controversy that exposed the design flaw

On 10 April 2026, allegations surfaced that an X account purportedly linked to INEC Chairman Prof. Joash Amupitan had posted pro-APC content during the 2023 general election. The opposition responded quickly. Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar and the ADC demanded his resignation, arguing that an umpire must not only be independent but be seen to be independent.

It is important to be precise about what is and is not established. INEC has dismissed the claims, stating that no verified forensic evidence supports them, and has said it is engaging independent experts to examine the matter. Some legal voices have also noted that the Constitution bars party membership at the time of appointment; it does not forbid someone from having held political views, or having voted, before. These allegations should therefore be treated as allegations.

But notice what the controversy reveals regardless of how it is resolved. A large part of the public did not need proof to find the claim plausible. When the process that produces the umpire runs through the party in power, suspicion is the default setting, and the commission starts every election cycle defending its neutrality instead of demonstrating it.

How the offices are filled today

Under Section 154(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the President appoints the INEC chairman after consulting the Council of State, subject to Senate confirmation. The appointing authority is the head of the party that will be on the ballot. The confirming chamber is one in which that same party’s numbers weigh heavily.

The police follow a similar pattern. When IGP Kayode Egbetokun resigned in February 2026, President Tinubu named Olatunji Disu acting Inspector-General on 25 February. The Nigeria Police Council ratified the appointment on 2 March at a meeting presided over by the President. That council includes the 36 state governors, the chairman of the Police Service Commission and the IGP. The process followed the Police Act 2020, and nothing in it was unlawful. That is exactly the point: a lawful process can still leave a trust deficit when it places selection of the chief law-enforcement officer in the hands of the political class.

Nigeria has been here before

The idea of taking this power away from the executive is not a new opposition slogan. The 2008 Justice Mohammed Uwais Electoral Reform Committee recommended that the National Judicial Council advertise the positions of INEC chairman and national commissioners, screen applicants and forward nominees for Senate confirmation. It also proposed fixed terms and removal only through a defined process involving the Senate and the NJC.

The recommendation was never adopted. It was dropped from the executive’s response to the report, and it was later rejected during the Senate’s constitution review. Former INEC chairman Prof. Attahiru Jega has repeatedly urged that the President’s role in appointing INEC leadership be minimised. A bill to involve the NJC in the selection has been considered in the House of Representatives constitution review committee. Reform groups have continued to urge the government to revisit the Uwais proposals ahead of 2027.

In other words, the diagnosis has been made, the prescription has been written, and the people who benefit from the status quo have repeatedly declined to fill it.

Why “Nigeria is unique” is the argument, not the excuse

Nigeria is often told to copy models from elsewhere. Our answer should be that the country’s circumstances call for a design built for its own trust conditions. Ours is a federation of deep ethnic, religious and regional sensitivities, with a history of disputed elections and a public that has learned to expect that institutions lean towards whoever appoints them. In such a setting, a procedure that is merely legal is not enough. It has to be visibly beyond the reach of any single office-holder or party.

A proposal: one independent appointments process for both offices

One option is a National Appointments Commission with a narrow mandate: to run the selection of the INEC chairman and national commissioners and of the Inspector-General of Police. The design principles matter more than the name:

• Open and competitive. Positions advertised publicly, with published criteria, and a public shortlist.
• Plural composition. Members drawn from the judiciary, the legal profession, civil society, labour, professional and faith bodies, and respected retired public servants, with no single arm of government holding a majority.
• Reasons on the record. The commission publishes why each nominee was selected, so the public can test the process.
• A cooling-off period. No one holding or recently holding partisan office, or a political appointment, should be eligible for INEC leadership. Reform advocates have proposed a five-year bar.
• Fixed, non-renewable terms and protected tenure. Removal only through a transparent, defined process, so the officeholder owes nothing to the person who might otherwise dismiss them.
• Legislative confirmation retained. The National Assembly keeps its screening role, now over nominees it did not hand-pick through the executive.

The point is not to remove democratic accountability. It is to separate the choice of the referee from the interests of the players.

The objections deserve answers

A fair case must face its critics.

“The NJC is not above politics.” Judges are appointed through processes that are themselves political, and some worry about drawing the judiciary into choosing officials who oversee politics. This is why a plural commission, rather than a single institution, may be the sturdier design.

“Scrutiny already exists.” Some commentators argue the real problem is weak Senate screening, not who nominates, and that a multi-party National Assembly already allows robust scrutiny. The response is that scrutiny after the executive has chosen is a check on a choice already made, and the Uwais experience shows how rarely it changes outcomes.

“Any commission can be captured.” True. That is why the composition, the removal rules and the transparency requirements matter as much as the principle. A badly designed commission would only relocate the problem.

“The police case has less precedent.” Proposals to insulate the police chief’s appointment are better developed for electoral bodies than for the IGP. The police case rests on the same logic, that a force answerable to those who appoint it will be perceived as their instrument, but it needs fuller drafting and debate.

The test for 2027

Nigerians are not asking for perfection. They are asking for a process they can believe in before the votes are cast and the first vehicle of security personnel is deployed. If the rules for choosing the umpire and the police chief stay as they are, every future controversy will land on an institution already holding its credibility in its hands.

The constitutional machinery for change exists. What has been missing is the will of those who would be giving up the power. That is where citizens, civil society, the press and responsible leaders in every party have a role: to make independence in these appointments a condition of the next political settlement, not a talking point that fades after each election.

A country serious about credible elections cannot keep letting the players choose the referee.